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I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
A.

Jurisdiction, The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in

this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1987 & Supp.
1991) since this appeal is taken from an Order Denying Motions to
Intervene and for Declaratory Judgment (the "Order").

The Order is

a final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction.
The Order denies Labor Services, Inc.'s ("LSI") motion to
intervene in the above-entitled action.

An order denying an

application for intervention which makes a final disposition of the
claims and assertions of the applicant is appealable.

Tracy v.

University of Utah Hosp. , 619 P.2d 340, 341 (Utah 1980). The Order
finally disposes of LSI's claims and assertions based on LSI's
right to intervene in this action to foreclose a mechanic's lien.
B.

Nature of Proceeding.

Commencing July 14, 19 89, and

continuing until October 19, 1989, LSI provided temporary labor
services for the construction of a new residence pursuant to an
agreement with the general contractor. LSI did not receive payment
and timely filed a Claim and Notice of Mechanic's Lien (the "Notice
of Lien") . On October 23, 1990, LSI filed a motion to intervene in
this action.
LSI appeals from the Order and separate Ruling on Labor
Service Inc.'s Motion to Intervene (the "Ruling") of the Third
1

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Leonard H. Russon
presiding.

The trial court held that LSI's action to foreclose a

mechanic's lien was commenced more than one year after the date LSI
provided its last services.
125-26).

(Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.")

The trial court also held that the Claim and Notice of

Mechanic's Lien filed by LSI did not comply with mechanic's lien
statute. (R. 126).

The trial court reached the conclusion that

even if LSI had commenced

its foreclosure action within the

limitation period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11, LSI's
Notice of Lien was legally insufficient and unenforceable. (R.
126) .
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien filed

by a subcontractor more than one year after completion of the
subcontract between the subcontractor and the general contractor
but within one year after work was suspended for thirty (30) days
on the original contract between the general contractor and the
owner of the property is within the limitation period provided by
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1988 & Supp. 1991)
2.

Whether the property description contained in a Claim and

Notice of Mechanic's Lien substantially complies with Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-7(2)(d) (1988 & Supp. 1991) where the notice of lien
informs interested persons that a lien exists on sufficiently
identifiable property and the complaining party has not been misled
or prejudiced by the notice.
2

Standard of Review, The applicable standard of review for both
issues presented for review in this case is the correction of error
standard.

This appeal presents two questions concerning how Utah's

Mechanic's Lien Law should be applied to this particular undisputed
fact situation.
court's

ruling

Accordingly, this Court should review the trial
for

correctness

findings no particular deference.

but

accord

the

trial

court's

This Court is free to render an

independent interpretation of the questions of law in this case.
See Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City
Corp. , 752 P.2d 884
770 P.2d

113

(Utah 1988); Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co. .

(Utah 1988); Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d

658

(Utah

1988); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

III. RELEVANT TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. S 38-1-2 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined.
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in this
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor,
and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials
shall be deemed subcontractors.
UTAH CODE ANN. S 38 -1-7 (1) - (2) (1988 & S u p p . 1991).
Notice of Claim - - Contents - - Recording - - Service on
owner of property.
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the
benefit of this chapter within 80 days after substantial
3

completion of the project or improvements shall file for
record with the county recorder of the county in which
the property, or some part of the property, is situated,
a written notice to hold and claim a lien.
(2) This letter shall contain a statement setting
forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if
known, or, if not known, the name of the
record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he
was employed or to whom he furnished the
equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last
labor or service was performed or the first
and last equipment or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the
sufficient for identification; and

property,

(e) the signature of the lien claimant
or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment
or certificate as required under chapter 3,
title 57. No acknowledgment or certificate is
required for any notice filed after April 29,
1985, and before April 24, 1989.
UTAH CODE ANTST. S 38-1-11 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
Enforcement -- Time for -- Lis Pendens -- Action for debt
not affected.
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for
must be begun within 12 months after the completion of
the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of 3 0 days.
Within the 12 months
herein mentioned, the lien claimant shall file full
record with the county recorder of each county in which
the lien is recorded and notice of the pendency of the
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the
title or right to possession of real property, or the
liens shall be void, except as to persons who have been
made parties to the action and persons having actual
knowledge of the commencement of the action, and the
burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those
claiming under him to show such actual knowledge.

4

Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or
affect the rights of any person to whom a debt may be due
for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a
personal action to recover the same.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-13 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
Parties -- Joinder -- Intervention.
Lienors not contesting the claim of each other may
join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions are commenced the court may consolidate them and make all
persons having claims filed parties to the action. Those
claiming liens who fail or refuse to become parties
plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and anyone not
made a party may at any time before the final hearing
intervene.
RULE 24(a), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented
by existing parties.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of the Case. Commencing

July

14, 1989, and

continuing until October 19, 1989, LSI provided temporary labor
services for the construction of a new residence pursuant to an
agreement with the general contractor for the project. LSI did not
receive payment for its services.

On December 14, 1989, within

eighty (80) days after furnishing the last labor at the building
site, LSI filed the Notice of Lien in the amount of $5,996.67.

5

On or about February 20, 1991, For-Shor Company ("For-Shor")
commenced an action, in part, to foreclose a mechanic's lien on the
subject property located at 3941 South Parkview Drive (3915 East),
Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property")- On October 23, 1990, LSI
filed a motion to intervene

(the "Motion to Intervene") as a

defendant and lien claimant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-11
and 13.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.

In response to the Motion to Intervene, David W. Early
("Early"), the owner of the Property, filed an Objection to
Declaratory Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Cross Complaintant's
[sic] Motion to Intervene and Cross Claim (the "Motion to Dismiss")
on the grounds that (i) LSI's action to foreclose its mechanic's
lien was barred by the 12-month statute of limitation provided by
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 and (ii) LSI's Claim and Notice of Lien
failed to properly describe the Property.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court. The trial court denied LSI's

Motion to Intervene and ruled that LSI's Notice of Lien did not
comply with the requirements of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Act. The
trial court also held that LSI's action to foreclose its lien
against the Property was commenced beyond the statutory limitation
period

and LSI could

not be afforded

mechanic's lien statute.

6

protection

under the

V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Early is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

and the reputed owner of the Property. (R. 91).
2.

On February 8, 1989, Early, as owner, and William Timothy

Savage d/b/a Savage Construction Company

("Savage"), as general

contractor, entered into an agreement (the "Original Contract") for
"the construction of

[a] new residence located at Lot #12 [sic]

Olympus Park Subdivision, Parkview Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah . .
. ." (R. 64) .
3.

In connection with the Original Contract, Savage and/or

Statewide Construction, Inc., of which Savage is an officer and
shareholder, and Labor Services, Inc.

("LSI"), entered

into a

series of contractor/subcontractor agreements (the "Subcontract")
wherein Savage agreed to pay LSI for temporary

labor services

provided to Savage for the completion of the Original Contract on
a day-to-day basis. (R. 77-78). The Subcontract referred to the
street address but not to the legal description of the Property.
4.

Commencing on July 14, 1989, and continuing until October

19, 1989, LSI duly performed in a competent and workmanlike manner
the labor and services required by the Subcontract, as a result of
which LSI became entitled to receive the amount of $5,99 6.67. (R.
78) .
5.

After LSI made demand for payment upon Savage of the

$5,99 6.67 in arrears, Savage informed LSI by letter dated November
16, 1989, that it had removed its equipment and personnel from the
7

Property as of November 7, 1989, thus suspending work on the
Original Contract as of that date. Savage predicated its action on
Early's failure to make payments of amounts Early owed to Savage
pursuant to the Original Contract. (R. 63).
6.

After LSI made repeated demands for payment upon both

Savage and Early,

LSI filed the Notice of Lien pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7(1) on December 14, 19 89, within eighty days
from the date LSI furnished the last labor in connectior with the
construction on the Property. (R. 65-66) . The Notice of Lien was
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, Entry No.
4860194 in Book 6183 at Page 3032 of the Official Records.

The

Notice of Lien states that the reputed owner of the land and
premises located thereon is Dcivid Early, that the reasonable value
of the services provided by LSI was in the amount of $5,996.67, and
the property to be charged with the lien is located at 3941 South
Parkview Drive

(3915 East),

Salt

Lake

City, Utah, and more

particularly described as "Lot 12 Olympus Park subdivision . . . . "
(R. 65-66).
7.

The Notice of Lien correctly describes the street address

of the Property as 3941 South Parkview Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.
LSI relied on the property description in the Original Contract for
the lot number contained in the Notice of Lien.

(R. 64). Savage

provided LSI with a copy of the Original Contract on November 20,
1989.

8

8.

On or about June 21, 1990, after the expiration of the

statutory eighty (80) day period, LSI discovered that the Property
is actually located on Lot 112 Mount Olympus Park Subdivision, not
Lot 12 Olympus Park Subdivision. (R. 91).
9.

On or about February 20, 1990, For-Shor Company ("For-

Shor") commenced this action, in part, to foreclose a mechanic's
lien on the Early Property.

LSI filed its Motion to Intervene

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-11 and 13 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
LSI's Motion to Intervene and Lis Pendens were filed on October 23,
1990. (R. 2-25) .
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
LSI COMMENCED THE ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN WITHIN
THE STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD AND LSI'S NOTICE OF CLAIM OF
MECHANIC'S LIEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
LSI provided labor services in connection with a construction
project that directly increased the value of the Early's Property
by $5,996.67. LSI has not received payment for its services. LSI,
as a subcontractor under the Original Contract between Early, as
the Property owner, and Savage, as the general contractor, timely
filed its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien on October 23,
1990, less than twelve months after November 7, 1989, the date
Savage suspended work on the Original Contract. It is indisputable
that LSI, as a subcontractor, filed its foreclosure action within
the limitation period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11.

Even

if LSI could be classified as an original contractor, however,

9

LSI's foreclosure action was still commenced within the limitation
period for original contractors.
The
Mechanic's

description
Lien

filed

contained
by

LSI

in

the

against

Claim
the

and

Notice

subject

of

Property

substantially complies with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2)(d).

Under

the facts and circumstances of this case, LSI's description of the
subject Property provided sufficient identification and gave notice
to all interested persons that a li^n existed against the Property.
In the absence of prejudice to the complainant, and in light of the
remedial nature of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Act, the lien should be
upheld.
The trial court erred in its application of the mechanic's
lien

statute.

The

trial

court's

determination

that

LSI's

foreclosure action was untimely and that LSI's Claim and Notice of
Mechanic's Lien was legally insufficient was incorrect. This Court
is free to independently apply the law to the facts presented in
this case and correct the errors made by the trial court.
VII. ARGUMENT
LSI COMMENCED THE ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN WITHIN
THE STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD AND LSI'S NOTICE OF CLAIM OF
MECHANIC'S LIEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
LSI, as a subcontractor, provided services for the completion
of a construction project in the amount of $5,996.67 for which it
has never received payment.

When LSI attempted to foreclose it's

mechanic's lien within twelve (12) months after the completion of
the Original Contract between the primary contractor and the owner
10

of the Property, the trial court incorrectly applied the limitation
period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11.

The trial court's

error resulted in an unjust denial of the protection afforded by
Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law to laborers who have added directly to
the value of the property owned by another.

It is indisputable

that LSI complied with the procedural requirements of Utah's
Mechanic's Lien Law and is therefore entitled to the remedy the
legislature intended to provide to laborers and materialmen.
A.

LSI FILED ITS ACTION TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN
AGAINST THE PROPERTY WITHIN THE LIMITATION PERIOD
PROVIDED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11.

LSI filed its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien against
the Property on October 23, 1990, less than twelve months after the
date Savage suspended work on the Original Contract. LSI filed its
foreclosure action within the limitation period provided by Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-11.
Section 38-1-11, Utah Code Ann., provides that: " [a]ctions to
enforce liens herein provided for must be begun within twelve
months after the completion of the original contract, or the
suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days . . . "
(emphasis added).
345

In Roberts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190, 479 P.2d

(1971), this Court noted that the foregoing provision is

appropriately considered in connection with Utah Code Ann. § 38-12, which defines the term "original contractor" as:
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in this
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor,
11

and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials
shall be deemed subcontractors.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-2 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
The completion date or the suspension date, whichever is
later, of the

"original

contract" is the measuring

event in

determining the timeliness of an action to foreclose a mechanic's
lien.

The completion or suspension of a subcontract is not

relevant to the calculation of the limitation period.

Suspension

of work on the entire construction project also is not a relevant
factor in computing the limitation period.

Case law interpreting

Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law supports this conclusion.
In

Roberts,

the

plaintiff

builder

attempted

to

avoid

application of the definition of "original contractor" in order to
classify himself as a subcontractor and take advantage of the
filing period determined by the completion date of the original
contract.

In this case, however, the plaintiff builder had an

express oral agreement with the Hansens to build a home on real
property in Box Elder County that the Hansens were purchasing from
the Ballards.

The Hansens dismissed the builder on October 25,

1968, before the construction project was completed.

Eleven days

later the builder filed a notice of lien against property which
stated that October 19, 19618, was the last date the builder
furnished labor or materials to the property.
The trial court dismissed the action based on the twelve
(12) month limitation period which applies to original contracts
12

under § 38-1-11.

The builder did not commence an action to

foreclose his lien until November 14, 1969, one-year and two weeks
after the builder had last furnished labor and materials to the
property.

In order to avoid the application of the definition of

"the original contract," the builder argued that the primary or
"original contract" for construction of a home on the property was
between

the

sellers).

Hansens

(the purchasers)

and

the

Ballards

(the

Therefore, the builder reasoned, (i) the Ballards, as

holders of the legal title, were the "owners", (ii) the builder's
agreement was with the Hansens and he had no contract with the
Ballards, (iii) the builder should be regarded as a subcontractor
of the Hansens, and (iv) since the home was completed less than one
year before he filed his action, his action was commenced on time.
Roberts, 479 P.2d at 346.
This

Court

rejected

the builder's

argument

because

the

builder's agreement was with the Hansens, as "owners" under § 38-12.

The Hansens' agreement with the builder was an "original

contract" and not a subcontract as the builder contended.

Since

the "original contract" was terminated on October 25, 1968, more
than twelve (12) months before the builder filed his foreclosure
action on November 4, 19 69, the builder could not obtain the
benefit of his lien. Id.

The Roberts Court did not expressly

address the consequences that might have obtained if the builder
could have been classified as a subcontractor, in part, it can be
assumed, because the answer is so obvious.
13

It is clear, however, from the Court's discussion of the
interrelatedness of § 38-1-2 and § 38-1-11 that if the plaintiff
builder

had

been

a

subcontractor

rather

than

the

original

contractor, the builder's action to foreclose his mechanic's lien
would have been timely under § 38-1-11.

The statute could not be

more clear: The twelve (12) month limitation period provided by §
38-1-11 begins to run upon completion or suspension of the original
contract, not

the

completion or suspension

of a subcontract

thereunder.
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals considered a similar set
of facts when determining the timeliness of an action to foreclose
a mechanic's lien in Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801
P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The Court of Appeals upheld the

summary judgment dismissing a painting contractor's foreclosure
action because the one-year limitation on actions to foreclose
mechanics'
action.

liens barred

the primary

contractor's

foreclosure

Although the painting contractor completed his work on

February 14, 19 86, he contended that construction on the house was
not complete until after July 1986, and his foreclosure action
filed on June 23, 1987, was within the one-year statutory period.
Judge Billings found it important to note that the painting
contractor's alleged contract was directly with the owner. "Copier
Painting was thus a primary contractor and not a subcontractor as
is often the situation where painting work is performed." Id. at
172, n. 11. The Court of Appeals held that the painting contractor
14

had completed the performance on its primary contract on February
14, 19 86, and the statutory period began to run on that date.
"Accordingly, Copier Painting's filing of this action on June 23,
1987, was untimely under section 38-1-11 as it was not filed within
twelve months of the completion of the original contract." Id. at
173

(emphasis added) .

Again, the Court of Appeals did not

expressly discuss what the outcome of the case might have been if
the painting contractor had been a subcontractor because those
facts were not before the court. It necessarily follows, however,
that if the painting contractor in this case had not contracted
directly with the owner but had supplied materials and labor as a
subcontractor, his foreclosure action would have been timely filed.
1.

LSI is not an "original contractor" as defined by
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-2.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that LSI is not an
original contractor within the meaning of § 38-1-2.

Early, as

owner, contracted directly with Savage for the construction of a
new residence on the Property.

(R. 64) . LSI did not expressly or

impliedly contract with Early.

Instead, LSI and Savage entered

into a series of subcontractor agreements wherein Savage agreed to
pay LSI for temporary labor services provided for the completion of
the project.

Since LSI never contracted with the Property owner,

LSI is not an original contractor.
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2.

LSI, as a subcontractor, filed its action to
foreclose its mechanic's lien within twelve months
after Savage suspended work on the original
contract.

In this case, the Original Contract between Early and Savage
was suspended on November 7, 1989.

(R. 63). LSI did not become

aware that Early had dismissed Savage until Savage informed LSI by
letter dated November 16, 1989.

(R. 63).

As a subcontractor

rather than an "original contractor", LSI had twelve (12) months to
file an action to foreclose its mechanic's lien after work on the
Original Contract had been suspended for thirty

(30) days.

A

foreclosure action by LSI, therefore, would not have been time
barred until December 7, 1989. LSI filed its Motion to Intervene,
Lis Pendens, and the Answer, Cross-claim and Counterclaim on
October 23, 1990, well within the statutory limitation period
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11.
3.
Even if LSI is regarded as an original contractor,
LSI filed its foreclosure action within twelve
months after it suspended work on the Property for
thirty days.
Even if the Subcontract between LSI and Savage is regarded as
an original contract, however, LSI filed its foreclosure action
within twelve (12) months after it suspended work on the Property
for thirty

(30) days.

If LSI is regarded

as an

"original

contractor", the statute affords LSI a choice of bringing a
foreclosure action within twelve months after the completion of its
contract with Savage, or, bringing a foreclosure action within
twelve months after there had been a suspension of work for a
16

period of thirty days, whichever is later. See Mickelsen v.
Crajgco, Inc.. 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989), quoting Totorica v.
Thomas. 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965).
In

Mickelsen

and

Totorica,

this

Court

considered

conjunctive language of § 38-1-11 and concluded
conjunctive implies a choice.

the

that such a

In the earlier case, the Totorica

Court considered a foreclosure action commenced by an original
contractor

more

than

twelve months

after

there

had

been a

suspension of work for more than thirty (30) days but less than
twelve (12) months after the contract was complete.

The Totorica

Court concluded that a "lien claimant's" action was not barred just
because a suspension of work for thirty (30) days had occurred
during any period while the contract was being performed and the
contract was not completed for more than twelve (12) months after
such suspension of work.

Totorica, 397 P.2d at 986-87.

More

recently, in Mickelsen, the Court reiterated the Totorica holding
in a case involving another original contractor in nearly identical
factual circumstances.
Neither Totorica nor Mickelsen distinguish between original
contractors and subcontractors for the purpose of establishing the
limitation period under § 38-1-11 because both cases involve
original contractors. Both cases stand or the proposition that the
conjunctive language of the statute provides "lien claimants" with
a choice between bringing a foreclosure action "twelve (12) months

17

after the completion of his contract,"1 or within twelve (12)
months after there has been a suspension of work for a period of
thirty (30) days, whichever is later. Mickelsen, 767 P.2d at 563.
The Totorica Court based its decision on the rationale that
the mechanic's lien law was enacted for the benefit of those who
perform the labor and supply the materials and that the lien
claimant's remedy should not be limited without a clear mandate
from the legislature. Id. at 986. Under ^.he fact situation in the
instant case, even if Totorica and Mickelsen are interpreted to
mean that the term "original contract" in § 38-1-7 was not intended
to be considered in connection with the term "original contractor"
in § 38-1-2 as contended by Early, LSI still

commenced

its

foreclosure action within twelve months after November 18, 19 89,
which was the thirtieth day after work was suspended on the
Subcontract between Savage and LSI. There is not, however, a clear
mandate from the legislature that § 38-1-2 and § 38-1-11 should not
be

considered

as

interrelated

provisions

1

and

LSI

is not an

In opposition to LSI's Motion to Intervene, Early contended
that a "close reading" of the language in Totorica and Mickelsen
supports the conclusion "that 'original contractor' does not refer
to the contract between the owner and the general contractor but
applies to the contract between the subcontractor and the general
contractor." (R. 130). Evidently, Early bases his conclusion on
the Court's use of the indefinite pronoun "his" when referring to
the lien claimant. However, in both Totorica and Mickelsen, the
Court was presented with lien claimants who were both primary
contractors.
Neither case deals with foreclosure actions by
subcontractors.
Anything more than a mere cursory reading of
Totorica and Mickelsen cannot support Early's contention.
18

"original contractor" for purposes of calculating the limitation
period under § 38-1-11.
4.

The trial court erred in its application of the
limitation period provided by Utah Code Ann. § 381-11 to the commencement date of LSI's lien
foreclosure action.

The trial court erred in its determination that LSI commenced
its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien beyond the limitation
period provided by § 38-1-11. As a subcontractor, LSI could bring
an action to foreclose its mechanic's lien either twelve months
after the Original Contract was complete, or in this case since
Savage did not have the opportunity to complete the Original
Contract, within twelve months after work had been suspended on the
Original

Contract

for thirty

(30) days.

Under

the correct

interpretation of § 38-1-2 and § 38-1-11, LSI commenced its
foreclosure action on time.

Even if LSI is regarded as an

"original contractor," LSI brought its foreclosure action within
twelve (12) months after work had been suspended on the Subcontract
and the action filed on October 23, 1990, was not time barred.
LSI provided labor services for the construction project on
the Property which directly increased the value of the Property.
LSI timely filed its action to foreclose its mechanic's lien and is
entitled to a determination of the priority of its lien against the
Property and satisfaction of its lien from the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale of the Property.
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B.

LSI'S NOTICE OF LIEN IS VALID AMD SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES
WITH UTAH CODE ANN, § 38-1-7,

The property description contained in the Notice of Lien filed
by LSI against the subject Property substantially complies with
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2) (d) which requires lien claimants to
provide a property description sufficient

for identification.

LSI's identification of the Property gave notice to all interested
persons that a lien was claimed against the Property.

In the

absence of prejudice to Early, and in light of the remedial nature
of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law, LSI's mechanic's lien should be
upheld.
The trial court erred in its determination that the property
description

contained

insufficient

for

in

the

identification

Notice

of

purposes.

Lien

was

Utah

legally

courts

have

recognized that substantial compliance with the provisions of the
mechanic's

lien statutes

is all that

is required

of a lien

claimant.

In this situation, a rigorous interpretation of the

mechanic's lien statute in not necessary to protect the interests
of the parties.

Case law in Utah and several other jurisdictions

supports a liberal construction of mechanic's lien laws.
1.

Mechanic's
lien
statutes
are
liberally
construed to give effect to their remedial
character.

Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan, 79 8
P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) , is the most recent opinion of this Court
regarding the sufficiency of the property description contained in
20

a notice of mechanic's lien.

In that case, a general contractor

appealed from a summary judgment invalidating its mechanic's lien
against property developed as a condominium project.

Several

lenders attacked the sufficiency of the description contained in
the contractor's lien.

Judge Orme, sitting by designation, began

his analysis of whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment against the lenders with a thorough discussion of the
nature and purpose of Utah's mechanic's lien law.
The purpose of the mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature
and seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who
have added directly to the value of the property of another by
their material or labor.

Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743

(quoting Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924

(Utah

1982) .2
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may
only acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provisions
authorizing them.

Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743; Utah Sav.

& Loan Assoc, v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338, 366 P.2d 598, 600
(1961).

"However, Utah courts have recognized that substantial

compliance with these provisions is all that is required." Projects

See, e.g., Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d
1382 (Utah 1982); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984
(1965); King Bros, v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254 (Utah 1962);
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207 (Utah 1959) ; Rio
Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1918); Bailey
v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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Unlimited. 798 2d at 743-44

(emphasis added); Graff v. Boise

Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983); Chase v. Dawson. 117
Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d 390,390 (1950).

"Moreover, we have stated

that '[a] lien once acquired by labor performed on a building with
the

consent

of

the owner

should not

. . .

be defeated by

technicalities, when no rights of others are infringed, and no
express command of the statute is disregarded.'"

Projects

Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quoting Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31
Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906)). Courts of other states also
subscribe to this view.

See, e.g. , H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical

Contractors of Alaska. Inc.. 563 P.2d 258, 263

(Alaska 1977);

Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co.. 713 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1986) .
"Although courts have differing opinions about how liberally
to construe provisions within their mechanic's lien statutes, xthe
modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules which have no
demonstrable value in a particular fact situation.7"

Projects

Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quoting Consolidated Elec. Distribs.,
Inc. v. Jepson Elec. Contracting, 272 Ore. 376, 380, 537 P.2d 80,
83 (1975)).

Courts repeatedly hold that labor and materialman's

lien laws should be liberally construed and applied in order to
reasonably and fairly carry out their remedial intent.

See Adobe

Brick and Supply Co. v. Centex-Winston Corp., 270 So.2d 755, 757
(Fla. 1972) (omission or error in claim of lien does not prevent
enforcement of lien as long as property can be identified from
description); General Electric Supply Co. v. Bennett. 626 P.2d 844,
22

846 (Mont. 1981)(whether given description is sufficient depends of
surrounding circumstances); Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc., 561 P.2d
750,

755

(Ariz.

Ct.

App.

1977)(substantial

compliance

not

inconsistent with remedial nature of mechanic's lien law); C-3
Builders, Inc. v. Krueger, 642 P.2d
19 82)(substantial
sufficient).

compliance

with

344, 345

(Ore. Ct. App.

statutory

requirements

Utah is no exception to the modern trend.

In Projects Unlimited, Judge Orme noted that Utah has followed
the modern trend in the legislature and the courts.

The 1985

amendments to the mechanic's lien law simplified the mechanic's
lien notice and in Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah
1989), this Court dispensed with the notion that the claimant's
verification required any formal ritual. Id. at 563.
In Midway Lumber, the court found that a liberal construction
of

the Arizona mechanic's

lien statute

(identical

to Utah's

statute) meant that the steps required to impose a mechanic's lien
"must be followed, but in determining what these steps are the
court

should

give

the words a meaning which

is reasonable,

consistent with all the language used, and conducive to the purpose
to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute."

Midway

Lumber, 561 P.2d at 755.
Courts generally eschew a technical approach to property
descriptions

in notices

of

claims.

Lien statutes

"must be

liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to
promote justice."

Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating Inc. v.
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Earth Resources Co., 684 P.2d 322 (Idaho 1984) ; Chief Indus. . Inc.
v. Schwendiman, 587 P.2d 823 (Idaho 1978) . Courts do not interpret
the various, but similar mechanic's lien statutes to require a
technical legal description.

Adobe Brick, 270 So.2d at 757; C-3

Builders, 642 P.2d at 345; Fircrest Supply, Inc. v. Plummer, 634
P.2d 891, 893 (Wash. App. 1981).
LSI clearly has established its right to protection under
Utah's Mechanic's

Lien Law by

complying with all applicable

procedural requirements. LSI's Notice of Lien contained a property
description sufficient to identify the Property.

Denying LSI the

benefit of its mechanic's lien based on a technicality would be
inconsistent with the remedial nature of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law
and the trend toward liberal construction of this statute to
accomplish this remedial purpose.
2.

Any error or mistake in the property description does not
affect the validity of the lien if the property can be
identified by the description.

Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of Utah's mechanic's lien statute
identify the statutory elements of a lien notice. At the time this
dispute arose, § 38-1-7(2)(d) provided that every notice of lien
recorded with the county recorder must contain, among other things,
"a description of the property, sufficient for identification."
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2) (d) . In Projects Unlimited,

Judge Orme

noted that the descriptive terms in a lien notice is to adequately
inform interested parties of the existence and scope of the lien.
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 747; see also Park City Meat Co. v.
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Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 155, 103 P. 254, 260
(1906).

"Courts look to see whether interested parties have been

informed of the existence of the lien and whether the lien has
misled or prejudiced those parties.

Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v.

Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 490, 700 P.2d 109, 112
(Ct. App. 1985); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781
(Wyo. 1986) (lien which contained "no adequate description of the
property" upheld where not claim of prejudice or being misled).
"When lien notices have sufficiently informed interested persons
that a lien exists on identifiable property and the complaining
party has not been misled by the notice, the purpose of the
provisions has not been thwarted and courts are inclined to find
substantial compliance." Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 747; see
e.g., Horseshoe Estates, 713 P.2d at 781.
a.

A property description is sufficient if
persons familiar with the locality can
identify the property from the description.

Other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have
created a substantial body of law regarding the sufficiency of the
property description required in a claim and notice of mechanic's
lien.

Based on a foundation of liberal construction, courts

consistently hold that if the description of the property contained
in the lien notice is sufficient to enable a person of ordinary
intelligence, who is familiar with the locality, to point it out as
the only one corresponding with the description, it meets ail the
statutory requirements. General Electric Supply, 626 P.2d at 846;
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Treasure Valley, 684 P.2d at 325; Turnboo v. Keele. 383 P.2d 591,
593 (Idaho 1963); Howard A, Deason & Co. v. Costa Tierra Ltd., 83
Cal. Rptr. 105, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).

In seeking to determine

if a party familiar with the locality can identify the property
from the description, "whether a given description is sufficient or
not depends upon the surrounding circumstances, the character of
the particular building, its situation with reference to others,
etc."

General Electric Supply, 626 P.2d at 846; Midland Coal &

Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 202 P. 389, 390 (Mont. 1921).
The Texas Supreme Court considered a factual situation almost
identical to the instant case in Rheem Acceptance Corp. v. Rowe,
332 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1959).

In Rheem, the parties agreed that the

only issue to be decided on a motion for summary judgment was the
sufficiency of a lien description in a lien contract that correctly
recited the street address but described the property as "Lot #9"
where the proper description was "Lot #19".

The court summarily

decided that as between the lien holder and the original owner of
the property, the lien containing the correct street address was
absolutely valid and enforceable against the original owner.

The

Rheem court adopted the "best rule" that if there appears to be
enough in the description to enable a party familiar with the
locality to identify the premises to the exclusion of all others,
the description will be sufficient.

Id. at 355.

The court took

judicial notice of the fact that there would not be two houses in
the same city of Irving, Dallas County, that had the same street
26

address.

"Certainly such a description would have been sufficient

to enable a party familiar with the location to identify the
premises intended to be described with reasonable certainty."

Id.

The only difference between Rheem and the instant case is the
involvement of a third-party subsequent purchaser in Rheem.

In

this case, only LSI and Early, the Property owner, are involved.
LSI's Notice of Lien correctly identified the street address of the
Property and Early had actual notice of LSI's lien against the
Property.

Certainly Early cannot argue that he was confused as to

the property involved.
b.

A property description is sufficient if after
elimination of the erroneous portion, enough
remains to identify the property sought to
charged with the lien.

In cases where the property description contained in a notice
of lien contained error, several courts have upheld liens if, by
rejecting what is erroneous in the description contained in the
lien, enough remains to identify the particular property sought to
be charged.

General Electric Supply, 626 P.2d at 846; Howard A.

Deason & Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. at 114. Using the correct portion of
the description contained in LSI's Notice of Lien, the Property is
described as 3941 South Parkview Drive (3915 East) , Salt Lake City,
Utah. There is only one address is Salt Lake City that corresponds
with the street address contained in LSI's Notice of Lien.

It is

clear that a person familiar with this locality could identify the
property subject to LSI's claim of lien using only the correct
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street address contained in the Notice of Lien.

The property

description

substantially

contained

in

LSI's Notice

of

Lien

complies with the requirement that the lien contain a description
sufficient to identify the subject property.
It is important to note that this is not a case where the
property description is unambiguously erroneous.

In other words,

the description of the premises charged with the lien does not
clearly identify the wror.g parcel to the exclusion of all others.
For example, in Ross v.

Olson, 523

P.2d

518

(Idaho

1974),

improvements were made to one portion of a large parcel of property
and the mechanic's lien positively and exactly identified the wrong
portion of the parcel. The court ruled that the lien claimant had
not achieved substantial compliance with the lien statute and the
lien was fatally defective.

See also, Brunecz v. DiLeo, 283 A.2d

606 (Md. Ct. App. 1971); Banco Mortgage Co. v. E.G. Miller Enters.,
264 N.W.2d 399, 400

(Minn. 1978); DiCamillo v. Navitsky, 386

N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Sequatchie Concrete Serv., Inc.
v. Cutter Labs, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
In the instant case, there is not a positive or unambiguous
description of the wrong piece of property.

The Notice of Lien

contains the correct street address and identifies Early as the
owner.

The only error contained in the Notice of Lien was the

omission of the numeral one (1) from the lot number and the word
"Mount" from the name of the subdivision. By comparison, in cases
where the lien claimant made a completely incorrect identification,
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the lien was invalid because it failed to provide any notice of the
property that was charged with the lien.

The discrepancy between

the lot number and the street address creates ambiguity in the
description rather than positively identifying the wrong property.
The

Notice

of

Lien

still

provides

an

adequate

description

sufficient to identify the property charged with the lien.

Any

question in this regard is eliminated by the presence of Early as
the only party involved, Early's actual notice of the existence of
LSI's mechanic's lien and the absence of innocent subsequent
purchasers.
3.

LSI is in substantial compliance with Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-7 and LSI's lien against the Early
Property is valid and enforceable.

Substantial compliance with the mechanic's lien statutes is
consistent with the remedial nature of the statute has been found
to be sufficient to create a valid and enforceable mechanic's lien.
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 743-44; Leeson v. Bartol, 99 P.2d
485 (Ariz. 1940); Midway Lumber, 561 P.2d at 755; Banco Mortgage,
264 N.We2d at 400; Morrison-Maierle. Inc. v. Selsco, 606 P.2d 1085,
1087 (Mont. 1980).
a.

Lack of prejudice to the complainant or thirdparties is an important factor when considering
whether the property description contained in LSI's
Notice of Lien substantially complies with Utah
Code Ann. S 38-1-17.

In discussing the factors of importance in determining
whether there has been substantial compliance in a given case, the
Oregon Supreme Court approved the following language from the
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Indiana Court of Appeals in Beneficial Finance Co. v. Wegmiller
Bender Labor Co. , 402 ISLE.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) :
Whether there has been substantial compliance by the lien
claimant depends upon the degree of non-compliance with
the letter of the statute, the policy which underlies the
particular statutory provision in question, and the
prejudice which may have resulted to either the owner of
the property or other third parties who have an interest
in the real estate.
McGregor Co. v. Heritage, 631 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Ore. 1981).

The

McGregor court also noted that the Indiana holding was consistent
with prior Oregon cases in recognizing that lack of prejudice to
the owner or third-party subsequent purchasers is a proper factor
to

consider

in

determining

whether

a

lien

claimant

has

substantially complied with the statutory requirements. See, e.g. ,
C-3 Builders, 642 P*2d at 346; Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Company,
Inc. , 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986); Buckeye Hauling, Inc. v. Troy,
43 Ohio Misc. 23, 332 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Com. PI. 1974).
Turning to the facts of this case, only LSI, and Early, are
involved.

No subsequent purchaser has been misled to his or her

detriment by the incorrect description, and the owner himself could
not have been misled by the incorrect Lot number contained in the
Notice of Lien.
erroneous

In this case. Early himself perpetuated the

identification

of

the

building

lot

identifying the lot in the Original Contract
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by

incorrectly

(R. 64) and in a

letter addressed to "All Suppliers & Subcontractors" dated October
2, 1989, (R. 134).3
Although the Notice of Lien referred to Lot 12 Olympus Park
Subdivision

rather

than

Lot

112

of

the Mount

Olympus

Park

Subdivision, the deficiency in the description did not result in
any prejudice to Early.

In compliance with Utah Code Ann. §

38-1-7(3), LSI provided Early with notice that his property had
been charged with a mechanic's lien by letter dated February 9,
1990, and delivered by certified mail. The Property is the subject
of substantial dispute and Early could not have been misled by the
minor inaccuracies in the Notice of Lienc

Furthermore, Early had

actual notice of LSI's lien. Even though the description contained
the wrong building lot number, the description was still sufficient
to enable Early to identify the property covered by LSI's lien.
4.

The trial court erred in its determination that the
propertv description in LSI's Notice of Lien was
not legally sufficient for purposes cif Utah's
Mechanic's Lien Law.

Contrary to the trial court's Ruling that the "whole purpose
of the notice of lien is for recording purpose" (R. 126), the real
purpose of the lien notice is to inform interested persons that a

3

LSI did not receive a copy of the October 2, 1989, letter
from Early to suppliers and sub-contractors.
The letter is
attached to Early's Reply Memorandum as Exhibit "2". (R. 134).
Although LSI did not rely on the property description contained in
the October 2 letter, the letter is further evidence that Early was
not misled by the description contained in LSI's Notice of Lien
because he consistently referred to the Property as Lot #12 rather
than Lot #112.
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lien exists on identifiable property,, In this particular case, the
Notice of Lien filed by LSI fulfills that purpose and is legally
sufficient under Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-7,

Moreover, in light of

(i) the general purpose of Utah's mechanic's lien law to protect
those who perform labor and provide materials on buildings of
others, (ii) Early's ability to identify the subject property from
the description given in the Notice of Lien and, (iii) the lack of
prejudice to Early or any other third-party, it is apparent that
the trial court erred in its determination that the Notice of Lien
was legally insufficient.

LSI's Notice of Lien substantially

complies with the provisions of the Utah's Mechanic's Lien statutes
and should be upheld by this Court.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, LSI requests this Court to reverse the trial
court's Order and Ruling and allow LSI to intervene in the aboveentitled action to determine the validity and priority of LSI's
claim and the claims of all other lien holders as provided by law.
LSI also requests an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs
of appeal as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (19 88 & Supp.
1991) .
DATED: June 24, 1991,
HANSEN JONES & LETA

Blcike D. Mil'ler
Marji Hanson
Attorneys for Labor Services, Inc.
Appellants and Putative Interveners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE"*
I hereby certify that on June 24, 1991, I caused to be handdelivered a true and complete copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
Allan M. Metos
Counsel for Respondent David W. Early
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

^t/c

\mh\lsibn"ef .1

** The Brief of Appellant was inadvertently filed without a reproduction of
the trial court's order and ruling as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f)(1). The Order Denying Motions to Intervene and for Declaratory
Judgment dated December 6, 1990, and the Ruling on Labor Service [sic] Inc.'s
Motion to Intervene dated November 19, 1990, are attached hereto as Addendum
"A" and "B", respectively.
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Third Judicial District

DEC 0 6 1990
SALl L A I \ £ G'OLiKi'V

ALLAN M. METOS #2249
Attorney for Defendant
David W. Early
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 363-5796

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FOR-SHOR COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO
INTERVENE AND FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs .
DAVID W. EARLY, TRUSTEE; SAVAGE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; STATEWIDE
CONSTRUCTION; and TIM SAVAGE;

Civil No. 900901033 CV
Judge Russon

Defendants.
LABOR SERVICES, INC. a Utah
corporation,
Cross-Claimant,
vs .
DAVID W. EARLY, TRUSTEE; SAVAGE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; STATEWIDE
CONSTRUCTION; and TIM SAVAGE;
Cross-Claimees.
oooOooo

This matter having come on regularly for hearing this
19th day of November, 1990, before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon,
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on the Motions of

Labor Services, Inc. to intervene and for a declaratory judgment
and submitted to the Court for decision under Rule 4-501, Utah Code
of Judicial Administration, and the Court being fully advised in
the premises and good caused appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Labor Services, Inc.'s Motions
for Declaratory Judgment and to Intervene in the above action are
denied on the following grounds:
(1)

Labor Services, Inc. failed to file its action on

the lien within twelve (12) months after completion of its original
contract as required by 38-1-11 U.C.A.
(2)

Labor Services, Inc.'s Notice of Mechanic Lien did

not contain a sufficient legal description of the property liened
as required by 38-1-7 U.C.A.
DATED this /,--. - 'day of NSvem&er, 1990.
i

/

Judge

am.e-fsord

2

/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this _____ day of November, 1990,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motions to
Intervene and for Declaratory Judgment was mailed by first-class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Duane A. Burnett
Attorney for Plaintiff
367 West 1600 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Blake D. Miller, Esq
Attorney for Labor Services, Inc.
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

anue-fsord
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NOV 1 3 1890
•JscU!~r^<^--
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON LABOR SERVICES
INC.'S MOTION TO INTERVENE

FOR-SHOR COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

900901033 CV

vs.
DAVID W. EARLY, TRUSTEE;
SAVAGE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;
STATEWIDE CONSTRUCTION; and
TIM SAVAGE,
Defendants.

Labor Services, Inc. has filed a Motion to Intervene, for
Declaratory Judgment, and for Leave to File a Crossclaim in the
above

matter.

The

said

Motions

have

been

submitted

to

the

Court for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
This action is a foreclosure action on two mechanic's liens
brought

by

plaintiff

For-Shor

Company.

The mechanic's

liens

pertain to plaintiff's materials utilized by other defendants
en property owned by David W. Early, Trustee.

Labor Services,

Inc. moves to intervene on the basis of its own mechanic's lien
as to services performed on the said property.

Labor Services,

PAGE TWO

FOR-SHOR V. EARLY
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Inc.'s services were rendered on the property, commencing July
14, 1989 and continuing until October 19, 1989.

Its Motion to

Intervene was filed October 23, 1990.
Defendant

David

W.

Early,

Trustee,

objects

to

the

intervention upon the grounds that the Complaint was filed more
than one year after the last services had been performed and,
Therefore, was statutorily barred.

It further argued that the

lien, itself, was not legally adequate in that it incorrectly
identified the property being liened, therein failing to comply
with the requirements of the mechanic's lien statute.
Labor Services Inc. argues that while it filed its Motion
after

the

one

filed

the

action within

February

20,

year

period,

1990.

the

It

other

mechanic's

one year

also

lienholders

period,

argues

that

that
its

had

being
error

on
in

identifying the lot in the subdivision to be Lot 12 instead of
Lot 112 was not an error sufficient to nullify the validity of
the lien.
The Court rules as follows.
and

Notice

requirements

of

Mechanic's

of

the

Labor Services, Inc.'s claim

Lien

mechanic's

does
lien

not

comply

statute.

To

with

the

derive

the

benefits of the mechanic's lien statute, a notice of lien must
be

filed

"for

record

with

the

county

recorder"

and

must

RULING
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FOR-SHOR V. EARLY

contain, among other things, "a description
sufficient

for

identification."

The

of the property,

said

notice

was

insufficient to give notice of lien upon Lot 112, Olympus Park
Subdivision.

The inclusion of the address does not cure the

statutory requirement since the whole purpose of the notice of
lien is for recording purposes and the county recorder does not
file by address of property, but by legal description.
Furthermore, Legal

Services, Inc.'s action

upon

its lien

was commenced more than one year after the last services of
October 19, 1989.

Even if the notice of lien had been legally

sufficient, the action taken by Labor Services, Inc. on October
23, 1989 was beyond the limitation period.
For the reasons set forth above, Labor Services, Inc. has
no protection under the mechanic's lien statute.

Of course, it

nay still pursue its rights against the parties with whom it
contracted on the debt.
Labor Services, Inc.'s Motion to Intervene is denied.
Counsel for David W. Early, Trustee, will prepare the Order.
Dated t h i s

/

/ dfevt of November,

1990.

p-e--^-^*^-^-/ fc
LEONARD H. RUSS6
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PAGE FOUR

FOR-SHOR V. EARLY

RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

foregoing

following, this

Ruling

-'/

on

Motion

to

Intervene,

to

the

day of November, 1990:

Duane A. Burnett
Attorney for Plaintiff
367 West 1600 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Allan M. Metos
Attorney for Defendant Early
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 260
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Blake D. Miller
Marji Hanson
Attorneys for Labor Services, Inc.
50 W. Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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